As a specialized intergovernmental legal organization for resolving international disputes, the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) is characterized by a treaty-based hard law nature. It adjudicates various types of disputes, incorporates flexible procedures embedded with Chinese harmony wisdom, and forges a distinctive dispute settlement model. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is currently confronted with multiple predicaments, including the suspension of the Appellate Body, excessive judicialization and inefficiency in adjudication procedures, dysfunctional alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, and reform outcomes falling short of expectations. Certain distinctive arrangements in the DSM of the IOMed can provide insights for the optimization of the WTO DSM: (1) Through a confidential mediation mechanism, parties are provided with an opportunity to back down with dignity, and the panel is encouraged to guide the two sides to reach a consensus on the basis of ascertainment of facts. (2) Establish a “Mediation and ADR Center” within the WTO Secretariat, ensure the establishment of a strict information isolation system between this Center and the Legal Affairs Division serving the panels, and promulgate a detailed protocol on mediation procedures. (3) Stipulate a mandatory pre-mediation clause, and allow the panel to disclose its preliminary views on the core issues to both parties prior to issuing its report, so as to encourage them to reach a settlement. (4) When appointing panel members or arbitrators of Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, greater consideration should be given to candidates’ cross-cultural understanding capacity; it is recommended that parties to specific types of disputes utilize the platform of the IOMed, and promote the WTO-recognized right to trade retaliation to serve as a safeguard for the enforcement of mediation agreements.
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Wang, E. (2025) Research on the Implications of the Establishment of the International Organization for Mediation for the Reform of Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization. Journal of Social Development and History, 1(4), 69-78. https://doi.org/10.71052/jsdh/HJVH3410